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Abstract 
It is widely assumed that people will share inaccurate gossip for their own selfish 
purposes. This assumption, if true, presents a challenge to the growing body of work that 
argues that gossip is a ready source of accurate reputational information and therefore is 
welfare improving. We test this inaccuracy assumption by examining the frequency and 
form of spontaneous lies shared between gossiping members of networks playing a series 
of one-shot trust games (N=320). We manipulate whether gossipers are or are not 
competing with each other. We show that lies make up a sizeable minority of messages, 
and are twice as frequent under gossiper competition. However, this has no discernible 
effect on trust levels. We attribute this to the finding that, one, gossip targets are 
insensitive to lies, and two, some lies are welfare enhancing. These findings suggest that 
lies need not prevent — and may help — gossip to serve reputational functions.  
 
Word Count = 150 
 
Key Words: Gossip, accuracy, lies, trust, competition, reciprocity 
  
TRUTH AND LIES 
 3 
Truth, Lies and Gossip 
 
The man who comes with a tale about others has himself an axe to grind. 
Chinese Proverb 
 
Within the body of cultural knowledge there are ample warnings, like that above, 
about the dangers of attending to gossip. Such warnings are present in the academic 
literature too. There, it has been argued that people will share inaccurate gossip for their 
own selfish purposes, such as undermining enemies, promoting allies or competing for 
mates (Hess & Hagen, 2006; McAndrew & Milenkovic, 2002; Mace, Thomas, Wu, He, Ji 
& Tao, 2018). However, this argument, if true, presents a challenge to the growing body 
of work that presumes that, as a ready source of accurate reputational information, gossip 
is able to bolster overall levels of cooperation (Dunbar, 1993).  
Gossip is the class of communicated content that conveys information about the 
behaviours and characteristics of social actors (Smith, 2014; Peters & Kashima, 2015). 
As such, it has the potential to inform us about our social world, and the reputations of 
the people who inhabit it. If people act on the basis of the gossip they hear, cooperating 
more with those who are said to have behaved cooperatively in the past, then there are 
incentives for engaging in the costly cooperative acts that build positive reputation 
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Barclay, 2012). In other words, 
gossip may enable the indirect reciprocity that has been argued to boost cooperation in 
large social groups (e.g., neighbourhoods, organizations, online communities and 
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markets; Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; for a discussion of indirect 
reciprocity theorising and gossip, see Giardini & Wittek, 2019).  
However, if gossip is inaccurate, such that information about a person’s 
cooperation in the past is a poor guide to their cooperation in the future, then this virtuous 
cycle could break down (Roberts, 2008; Smith, 2014; Giardini, 2012). In line with this 
possibility, a recent lab study (Fonseca & Peters, 2018; see also Fehr & Sutter, 2019) 
found that gossip was less effective at securing cooperation when there was (and was 
known to be) a high chance that messages would be misdelivered, and hence describe the 
wrong person’s previous cooperation. Interestingly though, there was no evidence that 
gossip was less effective when this inaccuracy was spontaneously introduced by 
gossipers. Therefore, it is currently unclear whether inaccuracy — especially that which 
occurs naturally — is indeed one of the main threats to the capacity of gossip to fulfil 
reputational functions. To shed light on this, we need a better understanding of when and 
why gossipers lie.  
In this paper, we summarise the results of a pre-registered behavioural study that 
was designed to build this understanding by examining the spontaneous lies shared 
between gossiping members of networks playing a series of one-shot trust games. We test 
whether competition between gossipers increases lying, a prediction supported by game 
theory (Crawford & Sobel, 1982), sparking a low-discrimination, low-trustworthiness and 
low-trust cascade. We test the following novel hypothesis: 
H1: As gossiper-audience competition increases, gossip will become less accurate.  
Further, replicating findings from a similar paradigm by Fonseca and Peters (2018), we 
also test the following hypothesis: 
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H2: As gossip becomes less accurate, (a) there will be less gossip-based discrimination, 
(b) leading to less trustworthiness, (c) leading to less trust. 
We also examine the form and functions of gossipers’ lies. This exploratory analysis 
reveals, for the first time, that lies are used to pursue negative and positive social welfare 
goals, and that some lies may serve reputational functions more effectively than truth. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 320 participants (48% male, Age M=20.30, SD=3.93) from a pool of 
registered participants of the UQEEL lab at the University of Queensland and leaflets 
distributed on campus. We recruited the largest sample that was feasible in light of limits 
to participant availability and funding. The resulting sample included more than twice the 
number of participants per condition than previous work with this paradigm (Fonseca & 
Peters, 2018). Participants were paid an average of A$19.94 for their participation. This 
study received ethics approval from the University of Queensland. Pre-registration, 
materials, data, code and supplementary analyses are available at 
https://osf.io/k3jsk/?view_only=fc0ee0aad2254356b458c28c00cd32f9.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in groups of 16 individuals who played 20 rounds 
of an anonymous trust game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995) on networked computers. 
Half of the participants in each group were allocated to the role of Investor and the 
remainder were allocated to the role of Agent. In each round, Investors decided how 
many of their 10-token endowment to send to their allocated Agent — a measure of trust. 
Agents received three times the number of tokens that were sent and decided how many 
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to return to the Investor — a measure of trustworthiness. Investors could, if they wanted 
to, avoid their Agent by sending 0 tokens. Participants knew that they would never play 
the same person twice in a row but that pairings were otherwise random.  
At the end of each round, decisions and payoffs were presented on screen. To 
elicit gossip, Investors were asked to send a message to the Investor who would play with 
their Agent in the next round. In this message, they stated the number of tokens they had 
sent and the number their Agent had returned to them (the factual behaviour remained on 
screen for reference). From the second round onwards, Investors received the message 
that described how their new Agent had behaved in the previous round before deciding 
how many tokens to send. Agents knew that messages about their behaviour were 
exchanged, but never saw them (consistent with definitions of gossip as involving 
communications about absent third parties; Smith, 2014; Peters & Kashima, 2015). 
To test whether competition could increase rates of lying, we allocated 10 groups 
of participants to the competition condition (the remaining 10 groups were in control). To 
achieve this, we assigned all participants a colour that they retained through the 
experiment (in each group, 4 Investors and 4 Agents were ‘red’ and 4 Investors and 4 
Agents were ‘blue’). In the competition condition, Investors competed along colour lines 
for a bonus. Specifically, the total payoffs accumulated by red and blue Investors over the 
course of the experiment were compared, and Investors belonging to the winning colour 
each received a bonus of A$5 (the losing colour received A$0). Colour had no payoff 
consequences for Investors in the control condition or for Agents in either condition 
(these participants received a flat bonus of A$2.50). Investors and Agents received 
different information about the bonuses in their group (neither was informed about the 
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existence of different conditions). In particular, Investors were always told about the 
basis for all bonuses (e.g., in control, that Investors and Agents receive $2.50), but 
Agents were only told about their own bonus allocation (i.e., $2.50) and informed that 
Investor bonuses may be calculated differently. Agents, therefore, had no reason for 
anticipating different Investor behaviour in competition and control.  
After completing the experiment, participants were paid (payment equalled a 
show-up fee plus 3 randomly selected rounds plus a bonus). They were then asked to 
complete a short survey. Among other things, participants reported their social bonding 
with same and different colour Investors and Agents (4 sets of 3 items from Peters & 
Kashima, 2007; =.86 to .92): I “had a social bond with [target]”, “connected with 
[target]”, “trusted [target]”. Investors also responded to 3 open questions asking when 
and why they had described an Agent’s behaviour “truthfully”, “too positively” and “too 
negatively”. Agents instead responded to 2 items about their reputation concern (r=.52, 
p<.001): “When deciding how many tokens to return, I thought about what the next 
Investor would think of me”, “I returned more tokens than I wanted to in order to ensure 
that the next Investor would see me positively”; and 2 sets of 3 items about their 
expectations of discrimination from same and different colour Investors (collapsed into a 
6-item scale: =.92; note that here, and throughout the paper, discrimination refers to the 
extent to which an Investor bases their decision to trust an Agent on the information that 
they receive about this Agent’s previous trustworthiness): “I think that [colour] Investors 
decided how many tokens to send me on the basis of the message they received about my 
behaviour”, “I think that if [colour] Investor was told that I returned a small number of 
tokens, they would send me fewer”, “I think that if [colour] Investor was told that I 
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returned a large number of tokens, they would send me more.” Items were accompanied 
by 7-point scales (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
A slight majority of rounds involved a trusting Investor, who sent a positive 
number of tokens (74% rounds; sent M=6.97, SD=3.05), and a trustworthy Agent, who 
returned at least one-third of received tokens (71% of trust rounds; returned M=45.21%, 
SD=10.84). In the remaining rounds, Agents were either untrustworthy (harming the 
Investor by returning fewer than one-third of received tokens; returned M=11.36%, 
SD=9.85), or were expected to be untrustworthy and thus avoided: avoid rounds were 
usually preceded by a message stating that the Agent had been avoided (23% cases) or 
that the Agent had been untrustworthy (tokens returned M=19.00%, SD=28.81; 49% 
cases).  
Any message that misstated tokens sent or returned was considered to be a lie. 
While Investors told the truth most of the time, as was observed in Fonseca and Peters 
(2018), a substantial minority of messages were lies (25.88%). These lies were 
substantial in size. In trust rounds, positive lies (N=171) claimed that an average of 7.93 
tokens had been sent and 14.56 returned, when the actual values were 6.84 sent and 7.44 
returned; negative lies (N=341) claimed an average of 7.87 tokens had been sent and 3.38 
returned, when the actual values were 7.22 sent and 8.68 returned. In avoid rounds, when 
no tokens were sent, positive lies (N=150) claimed an average of 7.68 tokens sent and 
10.48 returned, and negative lies (N=166) claimed an average of 8.07 tokens sent and 0 
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returned. For more detail relating to these analyses, and all those that follow, see 
Supplement.  
Manipulation Check 
To test of the effectiveness of our competition manipulation, we ran a 2 
(condition: competition, control) x 2 (target colour: same, different) mixed ANOVA of 
Investors’ reported social bonds. The main effects of target colour, F(1,157) = 141.75, 
p<.001, 2=.35, and condition, F(1,157) = 14.08, p<.001, 2=.08, were qualified by the 
two-way interaction, F(1,157) = 69.74, p<.001, 2=.20. This revealed that the tendency 
for Investors to report a stronger social bond with ingroup (same-colour) than outgroup 
(different-colour) Investors was more pronounced in the competition condition (ingroup 
M=5.29, SD=1.60; outgroup M=2.94, SD=1.30) than in control (ingroup M=3.60, 
SD=1.43; outgroup M=3.28, SD=1.45). This suggests that the manipulation introduced a 
stronger intergroup dynamic in competition than control.  
Hypothesis testing 
We first report the tests of our hypotheses that participants would be especially 
likely to lie if they were competing with their audience and that this would lead to a 
breakdown in discrimination, trust and trustworthiness (pre-registered analyses produce 
identical findings and are reported in the Supplement). In order to understand how 
competition affected rates of lying, we ran a mixed effects regression of whether or not 
the message was a lie on a condition dummy, an audience group affiliation dummy and 
their interaction. In line with H1, lies were most prevalent when communicating with 
outgroups in competition. Specifically, in the competition condition, 43 percent of the 
messages that Investors sent to outgroup audiences were lies, while only 20 percent of 
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those they sent to ingroup audiences were, χ2(1) = 192.19, p<.001. In the control 
condition, in contrast, Investors were about as likely to lie to the ingroup as the outgroup 
(21 and 19 percent of messages, respectively; χ2(1) = 1.03, p=.310). It is interesting to 
note that even in the absence of incentives one out of every five messages was a lie — an 
almost identical figure to that observed by Fonseca and Peters (2018).  
To see whether Investors were less likely to discriminate on messages when lies 
were more prevalent, we ran a mixed effects regression of Investors’ trust on a condition 
dummy, a gossiper group affiliation dummy, the content of the message (expressed as 
proportion of tokens returned), as well as all two- and three-way interactions. In line with 
H2a, we found a significant three-way interaction between condition, gossiper group 
affiliation and message content, such that Investors’ tendencies to act on gossip were 
more influenced by the gossiper’s group affiliation in competition than control, 
χ2(1)=5.18, p=.023. Specifically, in the competition condition, a message that an Agent 
had returned half of received tokens (versus none) increased trust by an average of 3.39 
tokens if it came from an ingroup gossiper, but only by 1.71 tokens if it came from an 
outgroup gossiper, χ2(1)=22.94, p<.001. In the control condition, there was no evidence 
that Investors responded differently to messages from ingroup or outgroup gossipers, 
χ2(1)=.79, p=.375, and the above message increased trust by 5.17 tokens on average. 
This suggests that the association between an Agent’s behaviour in one round and 
the number of tokens they were sent in the next was attenuated in the competition 
condition. To see if Agents took advantage of this opportunity to behave selfishly, we ran 
a mixed effects regression of the proportion of received tokens that Agents returned to 
Investors on a condition dummy. Unexpectedly, and contrary to H2b, Agents were about 
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as trustworthy in lower discrimination Competition networks (return M=34%) as they 
were in higher discrimination Control networks (return M=37%), χ2(1)=1.50, p=.220. 
This behaviour corresponded with our finding that Agents’ self-reported concern for their 
reputation (control M=5.51, SD=1.44; competition M=5.31, SD=1.47) and expectations of 
discrimination (control M=4.89, SD=1.41; competition M=4.66, SD=1.52) were 
reasonably high and did not vary significantly with condition, all t(156) ≤ 0.98, p≥.327. 
In other words, the actual discrimination that Agents experienced did not appear to alter 
their beliefs about this discrimination. In light of our finding that competition Agents 
were no less trustworthy than control ones, it is unsurprising to find that, contrary to H2c, 
levels of trust did not appear to differ across condition either, χ2(1)=0.21, p=.647. 
These findings are consistent with claims that lies are an important component of 
gossip, especially if there are material incentives for lying. However, while lies were 63% 
more prevalent in the competition condition (and levels of discrimination were 
commensurably lower), trustworthiness and trust were not significantly affected, which 
suggests that gossip targets are not especially adept at calibrating their levels of 
reputation concern to gossipers’ tendencies to act on the gossip they receive. The non-
trivial base rate of lies also suggests that a desire to mislead the audience is not the only 
reason that gossipers lie. Indeed, Fonseca and Peters (2018) noted that some gossipers 
provided unprompted descriptions of using lies for a range of purposes, including 
punishing or rewarding targets and boosting investment. To shed light on the range of 
purposes that lies may serve, we now systematically explore their form and function.  
Form and function of gossipers’ lies 
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We identified four main forms of lies. These reflected the interaction of two 
orthogonal dimensions: first, whether the Agent in question was trustworthy or 
untrustworthy (i.e., did they return at least 33% of received tokens, or did they return less 
than this), and second, whether the lie claimed that they were more or less trustworthy 
than they actually had been. Positive misrepresentation lies described untrustworthy or 
avoided Agents as more trustworthy than they actually were; negative misrepresentation 
lies described trustworthy Agents as less trustworthy than they actually were; positive 
exaggeration lies described trustworthy Agents as more trustworthy than they actually 
were; and negative exaggeration lies described untrustworthy or avoided Agents as less 
trustworthy than they actually were.  
As a first step towards understanding why gossipers chose to share these different 
kinds of lies, we independently coded Investors’ post-experimental explanations for their 
decisions to send accurate or inaccurate messages. This analysis revealed that between 80 
and 98 percent of codable explanations related to social welfare motives — that is, a 
desire to send content to help or harm the Agent or audience (coder Kappas = .65 to .94). 
Social welfare motives representing more than 5 percent of explanations for a given type 
of message are summarised in Figure 1.  
This analysis points to an important distinction between misrepresentation and 
exaggeration lies. The former type was solely justified by a desire to harm the audience 
(by encouraging behaviour likely to diminish their payoffs). In contrast, the latter type 
was either justified by a desire to help their audience (by encouraging behaviour likely to 
improve their payoffs) or to achieve reciprocity with the Agent (by encouraging 
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behaviour likely to improve the payoffs of trustworthy Agents and diminish those of 
untrustworthy Agents).  
Notes:  Percentage of participants using welfare themes when explaining when and why 
they used different content. Percentages calculated from Investors who reported sending a 
given type of message and provided a codable explanation: accurate N = 122, positive 
and negative inaccurate: Ns = 67, 79. Motives about the welfare of the Agent are on the 
left and motives about the welfare of the audience are on the right. Typical responses 
provided.  
 
Figure 1. Social welfare themes in participants’ explanations of their gossip content.   
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This suggests that the increased prevalence of lies in the competition condition 
should be primarily underpinned by an increase in misrepresentation (associated with the 
desire to harm competitor audiences). It also suggests that the lies that were sent to other 
(non-competitor) audiences should be primarily composed of exaggeration. To test this 
behavioural expectation, we used a multinomial logit regression of the type of lie on 
agent type (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), a condition dummy, a gossiper group 
affiliation dummy, as well as all two-way and three-way interactions. We clustered 
standard errors at the session level to account for interdependencies (Wooldridge, 2003). 
Figure 2 displays the results of the estimation.  
The analysis presented in text relates only to trust rounds, but the pattern in avoid 
rounds is generally consistent (see Supplement). In line with the possibility that 
misrepresentation lies are motivated by a desire to harm the audience, we found that 
gossipers were most likely to tell misrepresentation lies to outgroup competitors. 
Specifically, we found that Competition Investors made significantly more use of 
misrepresentation when messaging the outgroup than Control Investors did 
(untrustworthy Agents: χ2(1) = 5.36, p=.021; trustworthy Agents: χ2(1) = 11.56, 
p<0.001). Competition Investors also made significantly more use of misrepresentation 
lies when messaging the outgroup than the ingroup (untrustworthy Agents: χ2(1) = 11.10, 
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(a) Untrustworthy Agents 
 
 
(b) Trustworthy Agents 
 
Notes.  Graphs summarise the estimated proportion of messages about (a) untrustworthy 
Agents and (b) trustworthy Agents that take the form of exaggeration or 
misrepresentation lies in trust rounds. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 2. Prevalence of trust round lies as a function of lie type, condition and audience. 
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To examine the kinds of lies that were sent to non-competitor audiences, we first 
looked at ingroup audiences in the competition condition (with whom Investors reported 
having a strong social bond). Lies to this audience were never significantly more frequent 
than to outgroup competitors (tests for misrepresentation above; exaggerating 
trustworthiness: χ2(1) = 2.47, p=.116; exaggerating untrustworthiness: χ2(1) = 0.32, 
p=.574). However, we did find that when Competition Investors lied to the ingroup, they 
were more likely to exaggerate than misrepresent — although this difference was only 
significant when communicating about untrustworthy Agents, χ2(1) =5.61, p=.018 
(trustworthy Agents: χ2(1) =0.78, p=.376). This is consistent with the possibility that 
Investors may have used exaggeration lies in an attempt to help the ingroup audience. 
Next, we looked at the lies that Investors told in the control condition, which 
reveals a different pattern again. Here we find that Investors showed a preference for 
telling negative rather than positive lies (i.e., exaggerating untrustworthiness and 
misrepresenting trustworthiness) regardless of the identity of the audience (untrustworthy 
target: ingroup audience χ2(1) = 4.80, p=.029, outgroup audience χ2(1) = 3.84, p=.050; 
trustworthy target: ingroup audience χ2(1) = 3.78, p=.052, outgroup audience: χ2(1) = 
14.04, p<.001). This negativity bias is robust across more stringent standards for 
trustworthiness (i.e., where an Agent had to return 40%, 45% or 50% tokens to be 
considered trustworthy), suggesting that it is not due to participants having higher 
standards for trustworthiness than we do (i.e. a 33% return rate). 
Our analysis suggests that gossipers believe that misrepresentation impedes 
adaptive gossip-based discrimination, but that exaggeration facilitates it by helping 
audiences to reciprocate target behaviour. If true, this raises a novel possibility: that some 
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lies may actually support the indirect reciprocity that has been implicated in cooperation 
in large populations. To test this possibility, we analysed how the degree to which an 
Agent’s trustworthiness in one round was reciprocated in the next was affected by 
whether the message about their behaviour was the truth or an exaggeration or 
misrepresentation lie. We ran a mixed effects regression of the tokens sent to an Agent on 
a condition dummy, two lie dummies (exaggeration or misrepresentation, truth as omitted 
category), the Agent’s trustworthiness in the previous round (i.e., proportion tokens 
returned) and the two and three-way interactions between the condition, each lie dummy 
and trustworthiness. The reciprocation coefficients are graphed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Notes.  Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 3. Reciprocation as a function of message type and condition. 
 
Starting with the control condition, we find that the association between an 
Agent’s trustworthiness and the extent to which they were subsequently trusted was 
TRUTH AND LIES 
 18 
positive and significant when Investors told the truth, χ2(1) = 253.50, p<.001. 
Importantly, when Investors exaggerated the Agent’s trustworthiness, this association 
was significantly stronger, χ2(1) = 55.36, p<.001. In contrast, when Investors 
misrepresented the Agent’s trustworthiness, the association was weakly negative, χ2(1) = 
2.91, p=.088. Turning to the competition condition, we find that the association between 
an Agent’s trustworthiness and the extent to which they were subsequently trusted was 
positive and significant when Investors told the truth, χ2(1) = 191.33, p<.001, or 
exaggerated, χ2(1) = 13.15, p<.001; these do not significantly differ, χ2(1) = 2.53, p=.111. 
When Investors misrepresented the Agent’s trustworthiness, the association was again 
weakly negative, χ2(1) = 3.72, p=.054. 
   In short, these results suggest that truthful gossip and exaggeration lies are both 
likely to ensure that Agents receive their just desserts, while misrepresentation lies are 
likely to prevent this. To test this possibility, we ran a mixed effects regression of Agent 
payoffs on a condition dummy, two lie dummies (see above), an Agent trustworthy type 
dummy and the two and three-way interactions between condition, each lie dummy and 
Agent type. The coefficients are graphed in Figure 4 (panels a and c).  
This analysis reveals that payoffs to trustworthy Agents are significantly lower 
when their behaviour is misrepresented than when it is either truthfully described 
(control: χ2(1) = 100.88, p<.001; competition: χ2(1) = 59.10, p<.001) or exaggerated 
(control: χ2(1) = 47.57, p<.001; competition: χ2(1) = 38.34, p<.001). Payoffs from truth 
and exaggeration do not differ (control: χ2(1) = 0.18, p=.669; competition: χ2(1) = 0.21, 
p=.647).  
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Notes:  Panel coefficients represent mean payoffs (a and c: Agent payoffs; b and d: 
Investor payoffs) as a function of Agent trustworthiness in the previous round (a and b: 
trustworthy Agents; c and d: untrustworthy Agents). Error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 4.  Mean payoffs as a function of Agent previous round trustworthiness, message 
type and condition. 
 
The reverse pattern is evident for payoffs to untrustworthy Agents in competition. 
Here, payoffs are significantly higher when their behaviour is misrepresented than when 
it is either truthfully described, χ2(1) = 16.73, p<.001, or exaggerated, χ2(1) = 20.51, 
p<.001; the latter messages do not differ, χ2(1) = 2.30, p=.129. In control, however, 
payoffs from misrepresentation are only significantly higher than those from 
exaggeration, χ2(1) = 4.95, p=.026, and not those from truth (χ2(1) = 1.94, p=.163). 
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Further, payoffs from truth are marginally higher than exaggeration, χ2(1) = 3.19, p=.074. 
Thus, exaggeration is as effective as truth at achieving positive reciprocity, and may be 
more effective at achieving negatively reciprocity.    
As a final step, we ran this same analysis for Investor payoffs (Figure 4, panels b 
and d). When interacting with trustworthy Agents, Investors who acted on the truth 
received higher payoffs than those who acted on exaggeration (control: χ2(1) = 5.59, 
p=.018, competition: χ2(1) = 10.53, p=.001) or misrepresentation (control: χ2(1) = 38.35, 
p<.001, competition: χ2(1) = 22.19, p<.001). Investors who acted on exaggeration 
received higher payoffs than those acting on misrepresentation in control only, χ2(1) = 
4.16, p=.041 (competition: χ2(1) = 0.55, p=.459). When interacting with untrustworthy 
Agents, Investor payoffs did not significantly differ on the basis of the content of the 
message in either control, all χ2(1) ≤ 0.74, p≥.389, or competition, all χ2(1) ≤ 0.52, 
p≥.471. Thus, truth (and, to a more limited extent, exaggeration) improves Investor 
payoffs relative to misrepresentation when Agents are trustworthy, but does not when 
Agents are untrustworthy.  
These exploratory findings suggest that gossipers use lies to achieve a range of 
outcomes and challenge the widespread assumption that lies are necessarily malicious 
and harmful. Next, we describe the results of a study that aimed to independently verify 
gossipers’ motives for telling the truth or exaggeration or misrepresentation lies.  
Verifying the motives underlying gossipers’ lies 
We used an online experiment (N=81 UK-based adults, see Supplement for full 
details of method and results) that emulated the main study with a strategy method to 
independently verify the mapping of lies to social welfare motives. Participants 
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responded to an identical set of questions three times. In the first neutral audience 
iteration, participants were asked to imagine being an Investor in a population that played 
repeated trust games with Agents and exchanged messages about these interactions. 
Participants were then asked to imagine interacting with three Agents in turn: an 
untrustworthy Agent (sent 8, returned 3), a trustworthy Agent (sent 8, returned 10), and 
an Agent they chose to avoid (sent 0). In each case, they were asked to rate their social 
welfare motives towards (1) their Agent and (2) their audience (i.e., the next Investor to 
play their Agent; 7-point Likert scales: 1=strong desire to harm; 7=strong desire to help). 
They were also presented with three concrete messages that they could send to their 
audience (the truth, a positive lie and a negative lie) and asked to rate how much each 
message would allow them to jointly affect their Agent and audience as desired (8-point 
Likert scales; 0=not at all, 7=definitely). The content of the lies was based on the typical 
content sent about the three types of Agents in the main study, rounded to the nearest 
feasible integer.  
This was followed by two intergroup iterations. Specifically, participants were 
informed that they had joined a new population that consisted of two teams of Investors 
that were competing to earn the most tokens. They were asked to respond to the above 
questions twice: once for non-competitor audiences (i.e., ingroup members), and once for 
competitor audiences (i.e., outgroup members). The order of audience was randomised.  
To check that the Agent and audience manipulations affected participants’ social 
welfare motives in the expected ways, we first regressed participants’ desire to help 
(versus harm) their Agent on two dummies representing Agent trustworthiness 
(trustworthy or untrustworthy, avoided as omitted category), clustering standard errors at 
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the level of the participant. This analysis revealed that relative to avoided Agents 
participants were less motivated to help untrustworthy Agents (b=-0.71, 95%C.I. -0.94 to 
-0.47, p<.001) and more motivated to help trustworthy ones (b=0.59, 95%C.I. 0.34 to 
0.83, p<.001). We next regressed participants’ desire to help (versus harm) their audience 
onto two dummies representing audience affiliation (ingroup or outgroup, neutral as 
omitted category), clustering standard errors at the participant level. This revealed that 
relative to neutral audiences participants were less motivated to help outgroup audiences 
(b=-2.16, 95%C.I. -2.53 to -1.80, p<.001) and more motivated to help ingroup ones 
(b=0.67, 95%C.I. 0.42 to 0.91, p<.001). The manipulations were therefore successful.  
To understand participants’ mapping of social welfare motives onto different 
messages, we ran regressions of participants’ ratings that a given message would achieve 
their social motives for truthful messages and positive and negative lies in turn. To 
simplify interpretation, we ran the regressions once accounting for Agent type and a 
second time accounting for audience affiliation. In each case, we regressed message 
motive achievement onto participants’ desire to help (versus harm) their Agent and help 
(versus harm) their audience, two dummies representing either Agent trustworthiness or 
audience affiliation, and the four two-way interactions between social welfare motives 
and the relevant dummies. Standard errors were clustered at the participant level.  
The coefficients from these regressions are graphed in Figure 4. We first describe 
participants’ perceptions that different messages can achieve their goals for the Agent’s 
social welfare (panels a and c). The analysis reveals that the truth is seen to help 
trustworthy Agents, p<.001 (all other coefficients, p≥.133). Positive lies are seen to help 
Agents when the audience is neutral, p=.001 (all other coefficients p≥.074). Negative lies 
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are seen to harm Agents when they exaggerate their untrustworthiness, p=.012, or the 
audience is either neutral or an ingroup member, all p<.001. They are seen to help Agents 
when the audience is an outgroup member, p=.035 (all other coefficients p≥.126).  
 
Notes:  Panel coefficients represent each message type’s achievement of welfare motives 
(a and c: Agent motives; b and d: audience motives). Positive and negative coefficients 
represent message achievement of motives to help and harm, respectively. Panels (a) and 
(b) include Agent trustworthiness dummies; panels (c) and (d) include audience 
affiliation dummies. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Unstandardised coefficients of message motive achievement as a function of 
motive target, message type, Agent trustworthiness and audience affiliation. 
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We turn now to participants’ perceptions that different messages can achieve their 
goals for the audience’s social welfare (panels b and d). The analysis reveals that the 
truth is seen to help the audience regardless of their affiliation or the Agent’s 
trustworthiness, all p<.001. Positive lies are seen to harm the audience when they 
misrepresent an avoided or untrustworthy Agent, p<.001, or the audience is an ingroup 
member, p=.006 (other coefficients, p≥.206). Finally, telling negative lies is seen to harm 
the audience when they misrepresent an avoided or trustworthy Agent, all p<.001, but to 
help the audience when they exaggerate an untrustworthy Agent, p=.047 (other 
coefficients, p≥.187).   
 These findings are highly consistent with those of the main study. In particular, 
participants believed that truth would positively, and negative exaggeration negatively, 
reciprocate Agent behaviour. They also believed that truth and negative exaggeration 
would help, and misrepresentation harm, the audience. Participants appear to anticipate 
that outgroup members are less likely to act on their gossip than neutral and ingroup 
members, conditioning the ability of messages to achieve their social welfare motives.  
Discussion 
It is widely assumed that, given the opportunity and a selfish reason for doing so, 
gossipers will lie, and that this means that gossip is unlikely to support the indirect 
reciprocity that shores up cooperation. This study suggests that there may be many 
circumstances in which this assumption does not hold true.  
Replicating findings from Fonseca and Peters (2018), we find that gossipers do lie 
(although not all gossipers, and not all the time), and that self-interested motives are not 
the only ones in play. Thus, Feinberg et al.’s (2012) finding about the importance of 
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prosocial motives for people’s sharing of gossip extends to people’s decisions to distort 
it. Specifically, when it comes to exaggeration lies, gossipers report using them to help 
the audience better discriminate between targets and thereby reciprocate the target’s 
previous behaviour. In other words, it seems that exaggeration lies are the product of 
gossipers’ attempts to actively engineer indirect reciprocity. This observation aligns with 
recent theorising on the evolution of communication that suggests that in noisy 
environments, where audiences may miss signals, exaggeration is an expected adaptation 
(Wiley, 2017). Misrepresentation lies, in contrast, are the prototypical harmful lie — 
believed to be useful for harming the audience, and therefore directed predominantly at 
competitors. The behavioural data generally supports gossipers’ expectations about the 
impact of these different lies on the welfare of the target and audience.  
The above analysis points to one important caveat to the aforementioned 
assumption. If lies take the form of exaggeration, then there is no reason to suppose that 
this should erode cooperation, and indeed it is possible that it may bolster it more than the 
truth. If, however, they take the form of misrepresentation, discriminating gossipers and 
their targets will experience paradoxical outcomes. Over time, gossipers should stop 
attending to gossip and targets should stop expecting rewards for cooperative behaviour. 
With this, the benefits of gossip should disappear. In terms of understanding the apparent 
robustness of cooperation in our study to the presence of lies, this presents one potential 
answer: the rate of misrepresentation may not have been high enough to make anomalous 
outcomes sufficiently frequent to produce behaviour change. Indeed, targets in this study 
did not even appear to have insight into the levels of discrimination in their network. 
Together with previous work that shows that targets are quick to exploit low 
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discrimination when it is explicitly pointed out to them (Fonseca & Peters, 2018; Fehr & 
Sutter, 2019), this suggests that the task of inferring discrimination on the basis of one’s 
treatment is a difficult one.  
These observations provide some basis for expecting that gossip may be more 
robust to lies in everyday life than is commonly supposed. First, it is unlikely that 
misrepresentation lies will dominate everyday gossip. Misrepresentation always comes 
with a cost: gossipers can either mislead the audience (and thereby do them harm) or 
reciprocate the target’s behaviour; they cannot do both. In other words, the degree to 
which gossipers wish to harm their audience needs to be sufficiently high for them to 
sacrifice their powerful drive to achieve reciprocity (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). And second, 
as long as people believe that there is a sufficient chance that gossip is exchanged, is 
accurate and is attended to, they may adopt a risk averse strategy of being more 
cooperative than they would otherwise. 
 These claims are of course speculative, and are therefore worthy of future 
empirical attention. It is also important to acknowledge the limitations to our claims that 
are attached to our study’s operationalisation. Specifically, our study was designed to test 
arguments that emerge from the literature on indirect reciprocity, which is primarily 
concerned with understanding cooperation in large networks that involve limited 
opportunities for repeated interaction. In everyday life, people belong to many networks 
that allow for repeated interaction with some (if not all) network members. In such 
networks, direct reciprocity may come into play, as well as a variety of other social 
motives. Specifically, in circumstances when gossipers are not anonymous, a gossiper’s 
desire to enhance their status and build social bonds with their audience is, among other 
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things, likely to play an important role in their decisions to share gossip — and 
potentially to distort it (see Beersma & Van Kleef, 2012). How the multiplicity of 
motives that accompany gossip in many everyday circumstances will affect the dynamics 
that we describe here is an open question. It is also possible that patterns of lying that we 
observe for cooperative behaviour (which can be expected to vary over time, whether 
because of deliberate defection, error, or retaliation, e.g. Charness & Rabin, 2002) may 
differ from behaviours or characteristics that are less variable and therefore easier for 
audiences to verify. Further theorising in these domains is needed. 
In sum, this paper suggests that gossip can be inaccurate, but that this is a far from 
fatal flaw. To understand how and why gossipers lie, and their social effects, we need to 
move beyond an assumption that these lies are necessarily malicious and harmful and 
consider the evident richness in their forms and functions.  
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